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1 Introduction
The sharp increase in labor income inequality in the United States since the early 1970s
has been widely documented. The literature has made important progress in identifying
the causes of this phenomenon (see Acemoglu, 2002, for a survey). This paper explores
the consequences of widening wage inequality for the cross-sectional distributions of hours
worked, earnings, consumption and, ultimately, welfare.
We use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data for the period 1967-1996 to
document the changes in the distributions of wages, hours worked and earnings for males.
We ﬁnd, surprisingly, that notwithstanding the substantial increase in wage variance, the
cross-sectional variation of hours worked shows no trend in the 30 years of the sample.
However, we uncover a signiﬁcant rise in the wage-hours correlation. Consistently, we show
that annual earnings inequality increased substantially more than hourly wage inequality.
Previous authors have investigated trends in US consumption inequality using data from
the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Consumption inequality rose slightly during
the ﬁrst half of the 1980s (Cutler and Katz, 1991, and Johnson and Shipp, 1997) and has
remained roughly stable thereafter (Krueger and Perri, 2002, 2003).1
Figure 1 provides a graphical portrait of these facts. The variance of log male wages
rises by 13 percentage points from 1967-1996, with most of the increase taking place in the
1980s. The variance of log annual earnings rises by 20 points over the same period. The
other panels clarify that this discrepancy is not due to a larger variance of hours worked
but rather to an increase in the correlation between wages and hours. The last panel
reports Krueger and Perri (2002) data from the CEX showing that the cross-sectional
variance of log consumption increased only very slightly over the sample period.
Our approach for examining the macroeconomic implications of widening inequality in
labor income and its welfare consequences has three ingredients: 1) an empirical analysis of
changes in the individual wage process; 2) a calibrated model which generates predictions
for households’ consumption and leisure choices, given the input of the estimated wage
process and a particular set of insurance instruments; 3) numerical simulations of the
model economy to generate time-paths for the cross-sectional distributions of interest and
to assess the welfare costs of rising wage inequality.
In the ﬁrst step of the analysis we use data from the PSID to estimate a ﬂexible
speciﬁcation for individual wage dynamics, allowing for a range of possible sources for
1Blundell and Preston (1998) document that in Britain, where the increase in wage inequality followed
a pattern similar to the US, the rise in consumption inequality was strong until the early 1980s, but weaker
afterwards.
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the observed 1967-1996 increase in wage inequality. In our model, wages diﬀer across
individuals because of permanent individual diﬀerences related to education and innate
ability, because of diﬀerences in experience, and because ex-ante identical agents have
lived through diﬀerent labor-market histories featuring diﬀerent persistent and transitory
shocks to wages. The estimation of the wage process allows for time variation in the
variance of permanent wage diﬀerences (ﬁxed eﬀects), and in the variances of both types
of shocks.
We ﬁnd that the relative importance of the three components changes substantially
over the sample period. The period up to the mid 1970s is characterized by a rise in the
variance of permanent and transitory shocks, but a sharp fall in variance of the innovation
to the persistent autoregressive component. From the late 1970s to around the late 1980s
both the permanent and the persistent components increase sharply. In the late 1980s,
the permanent and the persistent components stabilize, and there is some increase in the
variance of transitory shocks.
The second step of the exercise is to choose an economic model. The natural economic
model for our analysis is the standard overlapping-generations incomplete-markets frame-
work developed, among others, by Huggett (1996) and R´ıos-Rull (1996). The overlapping-
generations (OLG) feature is important because the eﬀect of wage shocks is likely to vary
with age, because there is a strong age dimension to empirical income and consump-
tion inequality, and because the OLG structure yields transition paths that are directly
comparable to actual data. The incomplete-markets feature is crucial since the pattern
of household consumption dynamics and cross-sectional consumption inequality appear
grossly inconsistent with the assumption of agents being able to share risk through a full
set of ﬁnancial and insurance securities (Storesletten et al. 2004a, 2004b). The model
incorporates three sources of self-insurance: households have access to a costlessly-traded
risk-free asset subject to a borrowing constraint, labor supply is ﬂexible, and annuity
markets are perfect.2 In addition the government operates a pay-as-you-go social security
system that provides an income and consumption ﬂoor for retirees. The model is cali-
brated so that, on average, it reproduces a set of stylized features of the US economy over
the sample period.
In the third step we show that the model can account for the observed cross-sectional
dynamics, given the estimated wage process. Indeed, the model predicts only a minor
2For reasons of tractability, we abstract from “extensive margin” decisions. Focusing on implications
for male labor force participation, Juhn (1992), and more recently Juhn, Murphy and Topel (2002) have
documented an empirical link between declining wages at the bottom of the wage distribution and the
rise in nonemployment for these workers. In response to this, our empirical analysis focuses on prime-age
white men, a group with particularly strong labor force attachment.
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increase in the variability of hours worked, and matches the rise in the wage-hours corre-
lation: as the variance of the transitory shocks increases, labor supply tracks wages more
closely. Hence, the model is also able to generate the excess rise in earnings inequality.
Consumption inequality in the model increases in the 1980s and ﬂattens out in the 1990s,
when wage risk becomes less persistent. The increase in consumption inequality is slightly
larger than that observed in the CEX, but much smaller than the increase in earnings or
income inequality. Overall, we conclude that by combining the estimated change in labor
market risk with a relatively standard buﬀer-stock-saving model one can explain salient
patterns in cross-sectional US data.
Finally, we use the model to measure the welfare implications of the measured changes
in wage dynamics. In terms of ex-ante welfare, the worst aﬀected cohorts – those who
enter the labor market in the 1980s – suﬀer losses equivalent to a 5 percent decline of
lifetime income. However, this average number masks signiﬁcant heterogeneity in welfare
costs, as rising permanent wage inequality magniﬁes diﬀerences across skill-groups: low-
skilled workers bear losses up to 15 percent of lifetime income, while the high-skilled have
gains exceeding 12 percent.
A key decision that arises in measuring and modelling inequality is choosing the ap-
propriate unit of analysis. Wages, hours and earnings are recorded at the level of the
individual worker, while consumption and wealth are typically measured only at the level
of the household. Developing a full-blown model of the multi-member family with sepa-
rate, but correlated, wage shocks and with joint labor supply and consumption decisions
is a formidable challenge.3 The existing literature often simpliﬁes the household decision-
making process dramatically by treating labor supply as exogenous and thereby focusing
on shocks to household earnings (or household total income) rather than to each individ-
ual’s wages. We are unwilling to do this for two reasons. First, hourly wages are closer
to being exogenous from the individual’s point of view than are earnings (which partly
reﬂect a labor supply choice). Second, the ability to change hours is a potentially impor-
tant insurance margin in response to shocks. Thus, in most of the paper we adopt the
widely-used “bachelor model” of the household (see, for example, Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ,
1987) in which households comprise a single male earner who faces idiosyncratic shocks
to wages.
We argue the validity of this approach on two levels. First, the data suggest that
the male-wage-generating process plays the dominant role in accounting for both the
level and the evolution of inequality at the household level: in particular, the time-
3For examples of recent work starting to address these issues, see Gustman and Steinmeier (2002),
and Attanasio, Low and Sanchez (2003).
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path for the variance of log household earnings in our sample looks very similar to the
path for male earnings (see Table 1). Second, we develop an extension in which each
household contains two potential earners. This generalized model incorporates several
mechanisms that a priori might impact the dynamics of inequality at the household
level: insurance within the family, positive assortative matching, and rising female labor-
force participation. We ﬁnd that the general (family) and benchmark (bachelor) models’
predictions for the dynamics of consumption inequality are quantitatively very similar.
The paper closest to ours is Krueger and Perri (2002), who ask why consumption in-
equality did not rise in the 1990s, despite greater wage inequality. They show that in an
economy where the enforcement of insurance contracts is limited, an increase in labor mar-
ket risk can expand the set of risk-sharing possibilities by making autarky less attractive,
thereby reducing consumption inequality. In this paper, we take a complementary view,
inspired by Blundell and Preston (1998): even with ﬁxed borrowing constraints, greater
income inequality can translate into reduced consumption inequality if labor market risk
becomes more transitory and, as a consequence, more insurable through precautionary
savings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology used
in the estimation of the wage dynamics and the main empirical results. Section 3 describes
the OLG framework and Section 4 outlines our calibration to the US economy. In Section 5
we present the benchmark results. Section 6 contains a comprehensive sensitivity analysis.
Section 7 extends the baseline model to incorporate female labor force participation.
Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Individual Wage Dynamics in the US, 1967-1996
2.1 PSID Data
Our main data source is the 1968-1997 waves of the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID). We restrict our baseline sample to white males aged 20-59 who are heads
of household. Moreover, we exclude observations with top coded earnings, observations
with fewer than 520 annual hours of work (8 hours a day, 5 days a week, for one quarter)
or more than 5096 (14 hours a day, seven days a week, all year round), and observations
with nominal hourly wages below half the minimum wage that year. Lastly, we select
individuals who satisfy these criteria for at least two consecutive years. The ﬁnal sample
comprises 3,993 individuals and 47,492 individual/year observations.4 Table 1 contains
4More details on sample selection are in the Appendix. This set of requirements has been chosen
to closely replicate the sample selection criteria that many authors have used in the past decade when
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some descriptive statistics for the baseline sample. Since we exclude the SEO subsample,
we do not use survey weights in our calculations. Average age in the sample is around 38:
note the slight decline in the 1970s with the entry of the baby-boom cohorts. Average
years of education rise steadily from 11.7 in 1967 to 13.4 in 1996.
We report two labor income measures, annual earnings and hourly wages, the latter
computed as annual labor earnings divided by annual hours worked. We deﬂate both our
measures of income using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) and express them in 1992
dollars. Consistently with previous analysis, we ﬁnd no evidence of sustained growth in
the median hourly wage over our sample period. By contrast, median household earnings
rise substantially, thanks to rising female labor-force participation.
The variance of male log wages increases by 0.135 from 1967 to its peak in 1993. This
increase is concentrated in the 1980s: the increase is 0.025 during the 1970s, 0.08 in the
1980s and 0.03 in the 1990s. The college-high school premium rises by 17 percent, with
a decline of 4 percent in the 1970s, a rise of 14 percent in the 1980s, and a further rise of
7 percent in the 1990s. These two sets of statistics are very similar to analogous ﬁndings
from the March Current Population Survey (Table 4 in Katz and Autor, 1999), with
minor diﬀerences attributable to slightly diﬀerent selection criteria. Thus, the changes in
the wage structure we document are not peculiar to the PSID.
Table 1 shows that the total increase in the variance of annual male earnings is 0.20,
which is substantially larger than the rise in inequality for hourly wages. Comparing head
of household earnings to total household (head plus spouse) earnings, the average variance
of the two measures is virtually identical, while the increase in the variance of household
earnings over the sample period is slightly larger at 0.23.
Average annual hours worked are around 2,200 in every single year: this high number
(corresponding to approximately 8.8 hours per day in a 5-day a week, 50-working-week
year) is explained by the particular sample we have selected, with rather strong labor
force attachment. Interestingly, the variance of log-hours worked is very stable over the
documenting rising US wage inequality using CPS data (for example, in their survey Katz and Autor
(1999) select individuals working at least 35 hours per week, 40 weeks per year, whose wage is at least
half the minimum wage). In the discussion below, we show that our numbers align well with the CPS
statistics. We exclude black workers from the baseline sample for three reasons. First, our analysis on
PSID data shows that the changes in the income process for this group are quite diﬀerent. In addition,
Juhn (1992, Table 1) documented a substantial rise in annual non-participation among black prime-
aged males, but only a minor change for white males in the same age range. This is further evidence
that this demographic group has had a somewhat diﬀerent labor market experience over the past 30
years. Modelling participation decisions seems paramount for this group, while arguably it is much less
important for white male workers who have extremely high labor-force attachment rates. Finally, it is well
known that the wealth-income ratio among black households is strikingly low compared to that of white
workers, but the reasons for this are not yet fully understood (see, for example, Altonji and Doraszelski
2001). In a model where asset accumulation is the key source of self-insurance, this is a crucial diﬀerence.
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sample period, around 0.08, and shows no clear trend. By contrast, the cross-sectional
correlation between hourly wages and annual hours increases steadily until the mid 1980s
and settles down thereafter.5
A number of papers based on the PSID Validation Studies argue that earnings and
hours are measured with error in PSID data. Pervasive measurement error in hours can
lead to an overestimation of the variance of hours worked. Moreover, in the PSID hourly
wages are measured as annual earnings divided by annual hours, so the magnitude of the
correlation between hours and hourly wages can be underestimated: this problem is known
as “division-bias” in the literature. Assuming that measurement error is “classical”, the
additional variance of wages induced by the measurement error will mostly be picked up
by the transitory component of wage ﬂuctuations.6
The statistics we report for hours are corrected for measurement error (see the Ap-
pendix for details). This is important since the wage-hours correlation and the variance
of changes in hours worked are used to calibrate the model. Moreover, for our simulations
it is crucial to correctly estimate the size of the transitory component of wage risk.
2.2 The Statistical Model for Wages
The objective of this empirical exercise is to quantify the relative importance of diﬀer-
ent types of shocks in accounting for the rise in cross-sectional wage inequality described
above. The degree of persistence of labor-market risk is crucial to the simulation exer-
cise we perform in Section 5, since the persistence determines the insurability of a wage
shock, its impact on consumption and leisure choices and, ultimately, its impact on wel-
fare. In this section, we specify a statistical model for wages and show how to write the
covariance matrix as a function of the model parameters. Our estimation procedure is
a minimum distance algorithm based on the second-moments matrix of the hourly wage
data (Chamberlain, 1984).
Denote by wi,t the typical hourly log-wage observation for individual i in year t in
the PSID sample, where i = 1, ...I and t = 1, ..., T . Denote the individual’s potential
labor market experience (age - years of education - 6) by Xi,t. We start by running the
5In Heathcote et al. (2004) we check the robustness of this pattern using Current Population Survey
(CPS) data, which gives a much larger sample. Reassuringly, we ﬁnd that the time pattern is remarkably
similar across the two datasets, though the average correlation computed from CPS data is 0.1 larger
than the average (measurement-error-corrected) PSID correlation.
6This assumption is accepted by many (e.g. Meghir and Pistaferri, 2002), but not universally: Bound
et al. (1994) argue that if workers especially under-report transitory shocks, then measurement error
will be a mean reverting process. However, many estimates of the autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the
measurement error are statistically insigniﬁcant (for a recent estimate, see French, 2002, Table 5).
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ﬁrst-stage regression
wi,t = β0,t + f
(
Xi,t, β1,t
)
+ yi,t, (1)
where β0,t is a time-varying intercept, and f
(
Xi,t, β1,t
)
is a quartic polynomial in ex-
perience capturing predictable life-cycle eﬀects. The parameter vector β1,t is allowed to
change every year since the return to experience has risen slightly over our sample period
(Katz and Autor, 1999). The term yi,t is the stochastic component of labor income, from
which we identify diﬀerent types of shocks.
In choosing our model for wage dynamics we are guided by three considerations. First,
a large part of the increase in inequality is attributable to higher returns to education
and to “ability”, where ability is interpreted as characteristics of workers that are pre-
determined at the time of labor market entrance. In addition, many previous empirical
studies on earnings dynamics have found that the autocovariance function of earnings
asymptotes at long lags (e.g. Gottschalk and Moﬃtt, 1995). In light of these considera-
tions, we use an individual ﬁxed eﬀect αi to capture the contribution to his wage of an
individual’s permanent skills. This ﬁxed eﬀect has an initial variance σα at time t = 1
and an associated time-varying loading factor φt.
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Second, the typical autocovariance function for wages shows a sharp drop between lag
0 and lag 1 which is much larger than between any other successive pair of lags. This
suggests the presence of a purely transitory component that is uncorrelated over time
and that likely incorporates measurement error in wages. We denote by νi,t the genuine
transitory wage shock, by σν its initial variance at time t = 1, and by τ t the associated
loading factor at time t. In addition, we denote by µi,t the measurement error component,
which we assume to have constant variance σµ.
Third, the autocorrelation function of wages declines at a roughly geometric rate over
time, after the ﬁrst lag. Moreover, there are strong life-cycle patterns in the unconditional
variance of wages: in our sample, there is a two-fold increase in the variance between age
20 and age 55. These considerations suggest the existence of a persistent autoregressive
component ηi,a,t in wages that we model as an AR(1) process:
ηi,a,t = ρηi,a−1,t−1 + πtωi,t, (2)
where a denotes the age-group of individual i in year t, with a = 1, ..., A. The innovation
ωi,t to the persistent component has mean zero and initial variance σω at t = 1. The
loading factor πt captures changes over time in the size of the innovations. The variance
7Skill-biased technical progress and changes in the relative supply of educated workers are examples
of aggregate phenomena that are likely to change the market return to education and to innate skills.
The eﬀects of all such phenomena will be absorbed into the loading factor φt.
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of the persistent component across individuals of age group a in each year t is then
determined by the recursion
var
(
ηi,1,t
)
= π2tσω,
var
(
ηi,a,1
)
= ρ2(a−1)var
(
ηi,1,1
)
+ π21σω
a−1∑
j=0
ρ2j, a > 1 (3)
var
(
ηi,a,t
)
= ρ2var
(
ηi,a−1,t−1
)
+ π2tσω t, a > 1.
Implicit in the ﬁrst line of (3) is the assumption that the initial draw ηi,0,t of the
persistent component of wages (drawn just prior to entering the labor market) is zero
for each individual. Thus all predetermined aspects of wages are absorbed into the ﬁxed
eﬀect αi. Implicit in the second line of the recursion above is the assumption that before
time t = 1 the economy is in a stationary state for the wage process. Thus the variance
of the persistent component of old workers at t = 1 is obtained simply by cumulating
appropriately the initial variance σω. We regard this assumption as reasonable, since the
empirical literature has found that wage inequality was stable throughout the 1960s (see,
for example, Katz and Autor 1999, Table 4).8
Putting together the three components, we arrive at the full model deﬁned by
yi,a,t = φtαi + ηi,a,t + τ tvi,t + µi,t, (4)
together with (2) and (3) . The entries of the theoretical covariance matrix are time/age-
group speciﬁc and can be written as
var (yi,a,t) = φ
2
tσα + var
(
ηi,a,t
)
+ τ 2tσν + σµ,
(5)
cov (yi,a,t, yi,a−n,t−n) = φtφt−nσα + ρ
nvar
(
ηi,a−n,t−n
)
, t > n > 0, a > n > 0.
Clearly, one cannot separately identify the variance of the genuine transitory shock σν
and the variance of the measurement error σµ, so in the estimation we will use an external
estimate of σµ discussed in the Appendix (σ̂µ = 0.0207).
9
Our model with a ﬁxed eﬀect and persistent and transitory components is a general-
ization of the model proposed by Storesletten et al. (2004b): in their speciﬁcation the
variance of the innovation to the persistent component varies with the phase of the busi-
ness cycle. Note that we choose to model all time variation in the wage-generating process
8One could also allow the degree of persistence of shocks ρ to vary over time. However, Gottschalk
and Moﬃtt (1995) show that this parameter is remarkably stable over the sample period.
9The strategy of using independent estimates of measurement error to separate the two components
is common in the literature (e.g. Meghir and Pistaferri 2002).
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through calendar year eﬀects instead of cohort eﬀects. In this we follow the bulk of the lit-
erature which argues that cohort eﬀects are small compared to time eﬀects in accounting
for the rise in wage inequality in the US (e.g. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993).10
We show that, given an additional assumption on πT , our statistical model is identiﬁed
whenever the time dimension of the panel satisﬁes T ≥ 3. An assumption about πT is
required, since in the last period of the sample persistent shocks cannot be distinguished
from transitory shocks. We assume πT = πT−1. For the estimation, we use the Equally-
Weighted Minimum-Distance Estimator proposed by Altonji and Segal (1996) based on
Chamberlain (1984), and employed frequently in this type of analysis. The Appendix
contains a detailed description of the identiﬁcation strategy, and the estimation procedure.
2.3 Estimation Results
The age polynomial in the ﬁrst-step regression equation (5) explains around 8 percent of
the cross-sectional variance of log wages and 11 percent of its total increase from 1967-
1995. The results of the variance decomposition on the ﬁrst-stage residuals are plotted in
Figure 2. The most important of the three components is the persistent shock which in
the late 1960s is three times as large as the permanent and the transitory components.
With an autocorrelation coeﬃcient of ρ = 0.94, these shocks are quite persistent.
The relative importance of the three components, however, changes substantially over
the past three decades. The ﬁrst ten years of the sample are characterized by a rise in
the permanent and the transitory component, but a sharp fall in variance of persistent
shocks. In the 1980s both the permanent and the persistent components increase sharply.
Interestingly, the last decade looks quite diﬀerent: both the permanent and the persistent
component cease to increase, and decline somewhat towards the end of the sample. At
the same time there is a substantial increase in the variance of transitory wage risk. In
Table 2 in the Appendix, we report all point estimates with standard errors.11
10There is a large literature on modelling earnings dynamics. The early literature (Lillard and Willis
1978, MaCurdy 1982, Carrol 1992) assumed stationarity of the parameters, but following the documen-
tation of rising wage inequality, several papers have allowed for time variation (examples are, for the US,
Abowd and Card 1989, Gottschalk and Moﬃtt 1994, 1995, Haider 2001, Meghir and Pistaferri 2002; for
Cananda, Baker and Solon 1999; for the U.K., Blundell and Preston 1998, Dickens 2000, and Attanasio
et al. 2002). Our speciﬁcation is less rich than some others in the literature. For example, Meghir and
Pistaferri (2002) allow for an ARCH process in the conditional variance of the shocks, and Baker and
Solon (1999) introduce both ﬁxed eﬀects in earnings growth and a random walk. Although potentially
important, one should keep in mind that these extensions would substantially enlarge the state space and
increase the computational burden in our simulated economy of Section 5. In the choice of the statistical
model, we have kept computational considerations in mind. In Section 2.3 we compare our ﬁndings with
the previous literature.
11We checked the robustness of our results by relaxing some of the sample selection criteria (the range
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The key message of our empirical analysis is that the nature of the rise in wage in-
equality has changed over time. In the decade 1975-1985 it had a strongly permanent
character, whereas the rise since the mid 1980s has been more transitory. As a con-
sequence, one might expect the welfare implications of rising wage inequality to vary
signiﬁcantly decade-by-decade.
A number of existing papers using PSID data also ﬁnd that the increase of the 1980s
is dominated by permanent shocks. Using PSID data up to 1991, Haider (2001, Figure 7)
documents a pattern for transitory shocks virtually identical to our transitory component,
and his measure of persistent inequality also mirrors closely our persistent component.
Meghir and Pistaferri (2002, Figure 3) ﬁnd that the variance of permanent shocks to
earnings in the PSID data rises until the mid 1980s and falls thereafter. Gottschalk and
Moﬃtt (2002, Figure 2) also conclude that the permanent component rises in the 1980s
and levels oﬀ in the 1990s. Their estimated transitory component peaks in the early
1990s, in line with our ﬁnding. More recently, Primiceri and van Rens (2003) use CEX
data to argue that the rise in inequality in the 1980s was permanent in nature.12
3 The Economic Model
The model economy is populated by a continuum of agents. At each date t a new cohort
is born, with measure normalized to 1. We denote by a the number of years of experience
in the labor force, which we shall also refer to as an individual’s age. Agents live to
a maximum age A and are subject to mandatory retirement at age ar. The conditional
probability of surviving from age a to age a+1 is denoted sa. The unconditional probability
of surviving to age a (for a ≥ 1) is therefore Sa = Πa−1j=0sj.
Preferences are given by
E
A∑
a=0
βaSau (ca, ha, νa) , (6)
for hours worked, and the lower threshold for hourly wages as a fraction of the minimum wage). The time-
pattern for each component is fairly robust to alternative criteria: the persistent component consistently
falls in the ﬁrst decade, rises sharply in the second, and declines or ﬂattens out in the third decade.
The permanent component always rises strongly until the mid 1980s, and it levels oﬀ in the 1990s. The
transitory component always rises in the ﬁrst and the third decade, while it stagnates in the second
one. Quantitatively, there are some diﬀerences across the various sample cuts, but they do not seem
large, especially considering that in some of our alternative samples, the number of observations changes
considerably.
12Interestingly, some recent results for the U.K. – where wage inequality has also increased substantially
since the mid 1970s – seem to follow a pattern close to our ﬁndings. Blundell and Preston (1998) estimate
strong growth in the volatility of transitory shocks since the late 1980s using data from the British
Family Expenditure Survey. Evidence from the New Earnings Survey Panel conﬁrms that the rise in the
permanent component occurs primarily before the mid 1980s, whereas the transitory component increases
sharply after 1984 (Dickens 2000, Figure 3).
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where ca denotes consumption, ha denotes hours worked, and νa denotes the reduction to
the time endowment associated with experiencing a spell of unemployment (see below)
for an agent of age a. Agents are not altruistic. The period utility function is invariant
to time and age:
u(c, h, ν) =
c1−γ
1− γ + ϕ
(1− ν − h)1−σ
1− σ . (7)
We have chosen this speciﬁcation for two reasons. First, it permits us to separate the
intertemporal elasticities of consumption and leisure. Second, with these preferences the
sign of the wealth eﬀect of permanent wage changes is governed by the parameter γ.13
Both these degrees of ﬂexibility turn out to be crucial in accounting for salient features
of data on hours worked.14
Agents save in terms of a single risk-free asset. A ﬁnancial intermediary pools savings
at the end of a period, and returns pooled savings proportionately to agents who are still
alive at the start of the next period at actuarially-fair age-dependent rates. In this sense,
annuity markets are perfect. By construction, preferences and the asset market structure
imply that there are no bequests (either voluntary or accidental) in equilibrium.
The budget constraint for household i of age a at date t is
ci,a,t + saki,a+1,t+1 ≤ mi,a,t + ki,a,t, (8)
where mi,a,t denotes agent i’s after-tax income at date t, ki,a,t denotes i’s asset holdings in
period t, and sa captures the survivor’s premium implied by the perfect annuity markets.
Initial wealth is zero. Subsequently, an agent has three potential sources of income: labor
earnings, interest income, and pension income. Thus
mi,a,t =
{
(1− τn)wtei,a,thi,a,t + (1− τ k)rtki,a,t if a < ar,
(1− τ k)rtki,a,t + p otherwise. (9)
Here wt denotes the mean wage rate in the economy. The interest rate rt denotes the
pre-tax return on savings. The individual’s eﬀective labor supply is the product of hours
worked hi,a,t and idiosyncratic labor productivity, denoted ei,a,t. Agents older than the
retirement age ar have zero labor income but receive a lump-sum pension beneﬁt p.
13For example, in a static economy, the intra-temporal ﬁrst-order condition would be
ψ (1− ν − h)−σ hγ = w1−γ . The left-hand side is monotone increasing in hours worked. When γ > (<)1,
the right-hand side is decreasing (increasing) in the “permanent wage” w, which means that h must fall
(increase) as w increases.
14These preferences are consistent with balanced growth only when γ = 1. When γ > 1 labor supply
will fall over time in an economy exhibiting secular wage growth, an implication consistent with data on
male labor supply (see, for example, McGrattan and Rogerson, 1998).
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Log of labor productivity for workers (with age a < ar) is the sum of three components:
ln(ei,a,t) = ζt + κa + yi,a,t. (10)
The term κa captures the deterministic hump-shaped productivity variation over the life
cycle, and the term ζt ensures that the mean (cross-sectional) level of labor productivity
is constant over time.15 Thus any changes in mean wages through time reﬂect changes in
wt. The components of idiosyncratic productivity yi,a,t are deﬁned exactly as in equation
(4).
The agent’s time endowment is normalized to 1. Workers are subjected to i.i.d. un-
employment shocks ν ∈ {0, ν}, where experiencing a spell of unemployment means being
forced to spend a fraction ν of the time endowment searching for a new job. Search gives
the same disutility as work, so unemployment eﬀectively amounts to a reduction in the
total time available for work and leisure.16
Households are allowed to borrow up to some exogenous borrowing limit b. In addition,
hours and leisure must both be non-negative. Thus
ki,a,t ≥ −b, 0 ≤ hi,a,t ≤ 1− νi,a,t ∀i, a, t. (11)
Households choose savings and labor supply to maximize the objective function in (6),
subject to a sequence of budget constraints (8) and to the time and borrowing constraints
(11), taking as given sequences for rt and wt, as well as the stochastic process for labor
productivity.
Output is produced by a competitive representative ﬁrm using capital and labor ac-
cording to a Cobb-Douglas production technology Yt = K
θ
t N
1−θ
t , where θ is capital’s share
of output. The government budget is balanced every period. Tax rates τn and τ k, and
pension beneﬁts p are held constant. Once the pension system has been ﬁnanced, any
excess tax revenues are spent on non-valued government consumption Gt.
15Note that the shock process is such that the mean value for yi,a,t is always zero by construction for
every age and every date. However, the variance of the shocks is time varying. This means that without
the ζt term, the mean value for the productivity level ei,a,t – the exponent of yi,a,t – would be high in
periods of high idiosyncratic productivity variance.
16Krusell and Smith (1998) oﬀer an alternative way of modelling unemployment risk, namely as unem-
ployment ruling out any work within a period, with the employment status following a Markov process.
However, since US average unemployment duration is around 6 weeks, this approach requires the length
of a period to be very short. This introduces two problems. First, the additional computational burden
of solving the model with such short time periods would be very large. Second, our data are annual and
it is not obvious how to convert the wage process to 6-week periods. Due to these concerns, we prefer
our simpler speciﬁcation.
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3.1 Perfect Foresight Equilibrium
In our economy, the parameters of the stochastic process for individual labor productivity
change over time. As a starting point, we assume that all agents, irrespective of their
date of birth, foresee the entire future sequence of these parameters (though of course
they do not foresee their own particular wage draws). Since there is a continuum of
agents of each age, the law of large numbers then implies that factor prices are perfectly
forecastable as well. One might question whether individuals did in fact foresee widening
wage inequality. In Section 6 we therefore consider a diametrically diﬀerent information
structure – a model in which agents each period myopically assume that the current
process will persist forever.
Closed-Economy Equilibrium A closed-economy equilibrium for this economy is
(i) a sequence of prices {rt} and {wt} , (ii) a set of age and year varying functions {ca,t} ,
{ka,t} and {ha,t} which map each possible combination of wealth, unemployment status,
ﬁxed eﬀect, persistent shock, and transitory shock into choices for savings and labor sup-
ply, (iii) a sequence of measures {µt} describing the joint distribution of households over
age, wealth, unemployment status and each idiosyncratic component of wages at date t,
and (iv) a sequence of values for aggregates {Ct, Gt, Nt, Kt, Yt} with the following proper-
ties: (1) The decision rules solve the household’s maximization problem. (2) The sequence
of measures {µt} is consistent with the decision rules and the process for individual labor
productivity, given an initial measure µ0. (3) Aggregate variables are consistent with
individual decisions (Ct =
∫
ca,tdµt, Kt =
∫
ka,tdµt, and Nt =
∫
ea,tha,tdµt). (4) Factor
prices equal marginal productivities (rt = θK
θ−1
t N
1−θ
t − δ, and wt = (1− θ)Kθt N−θt ). (5)
The government budget constraint is satisﬁed (p
∑A
a=ar
Sa + Gt = τnwtNt + τ krtKt). (6)
The aggregate resource constraint is satisﬁed (Ct + Gt + Kt+1 = Yt + (1− δ)Kt).
Open-Economy Equilibrium In the initial set of simulations we consider an open-
economy version of the model in order to abstract from general equilibrium considerations.
In the open-economy version of the model, the real interest rate is equal to the constant
world interest rate r∗. The capital-labor ratio is therefore time-invariant, and thus the
wage rate wt is also constant. Given a value for aggregate eﬀective labor supply, the world
interest rate pins down the aggregate capital stock, which is no longer necessarily equal to
aggregate domestic savings. Net exports NXt may be deﬁned residually at every period
given the new version of the aggregate resource constraint:
Ct + Gt + Kt+1 + NXt = Yt + (1− δ)Kt.
In all other respects, the deﬁnition of equilibrium is the same as for the closed-economy
version described above.
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There are several attractive features of the open-economy version of the model. First,
any diﬀerences in the expected lifetime utility of individuals born at diﬀerent dates are
directly attributable to changes in the variance of shocks to wages, since all individuals are
born with zero wealth and throughout their lifetimes face the same real after-tax interest
rates and the same growth rate for mean after-tax real wages. Second, international
capital ﬂows cast doubt on the closed-economy assumption, even for the US.
4 Calibration
Our calibration strategy is to choose parameter values so that the model economy repro-
duces on average certain properties of the US economy in the sample period 1967-1996.
Note that the calibration procedure is not designed to match any observed changes over
time: those will be the focus of the model simulations.
Demographics The model period is one year. Households are born at age 20, work
for 40 years, and retire on their 60th birthday. Thus the age range of individuals in the
model is the same as the range we selected in estimating the wage process using PSID
data. The maximum possible age is assumed to be 99. Mortality probabilities are taken
from the US Life Tables of the National Center for Health Statistics (1992).
Preferences Since agents use wealth to self-insure against shocks, it is important to
calibrate the model so that it captures salient features of the wealth distribution. To this
end, we set the discount factor β so the model’s aggregate wealth/income ratio matches
that of the wealth-poorest 99 percent of households in the US economy. From Table 3 in
Wolﬀ (2000), this ratio was 3.45 in 1983, which is roughly in the middle of our sample
period. Given other parameter values, the implied value for β is 0.962.17
The weight parameter on leisure is set to ψ = 1.225, so that the average fraction of
time devoted to market activities in the ﬁnal steady-state is 0.4, which is approximately
equal to average annual market hours in our sample as a fraction of total disposable time
(assuming eight hours per day for sleep).
The risk aversion coeﬃcient γ is set to match the average wage-hours correlation in
our PSID sample, corrected for measurement error. Note that when γ = 1, cross-sectional
wage diﬀerentials due to non-permanent shocks are positively correlated with diﬀerences
in hours worked, while cross-sectional wage diﬀerentials associated with permanent dif-
ferences in wages (e.g. diﬀerent skill levels) do not aﬀect hours worked. Thus for γ = 1
17The reason for ignoring the wealthiest 1% of households is that our data-source for wages, earnings
and income – the PSID – undersamples the richest households in the US. For example, Juster et al. (1999)
show that the PSID accurately represents households in the bottom 99% of the wealth distribution, but
does a poor job for the top 1%.
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the correlation between hours and wages is high. As γ is increased above one, permanent
cross-sectional diﬀerences in wages become negatively correlated with diﬀerences in hours
worked, which reduces the overall wage-hours correlation. Over the 1967-96 period, this
correlation was 0.02, after correcting for measurement error. The model reproduces this
ﬁgure for γ = 1.44, a fairly standard number.18
The parameter σ determines the labor supply elasticity, and we set this parameter
so that the model matches the mean standard deviation of the change in hours worked,
std(hi,t+1 − hi,t). In our data, the average value for this statistic over the 1967-1996
period is 0.068, after correcting for measurement error. The resulting value for σ is 2.36.
This implies a Frisch elasticity for hours worked of 0.64 for an individual working average
hours.19 The calibrated value for σ is well within the (wide) range of existing micro and
macro estimates (see Browning et al., 1999, for a useful survey). In Section 6 we will also
experiment with alternative values of σ. For example, we shall consider a speciﬁcation
in which utility is logarithmic in leisure, and a speciﬁcation in which labor supply is
completely inﬂexible (i.e., there is no leisure choice).
Unemployment Shocks We calibrate ν – the required search period for an agent
who experiences an unemployment shock – to match the average duration of unemploy-
ment in the US economy. Thus agents who experience unemployment are assumed to
spend 13.5 weeks looking for work, and ν is set such that annual hours of (part-time)
unemployed workers are 74% of hours of the full-time employed. With the time endow-
ment normalized to 1, this implies ν = 0.133. The incidence of unemployment q (i.e.,
the fraction of the population experiencing an unemployment spell during a given year)
is set to 17.5%. With each unemployment spell lasting for 0.26 periods (13.5 weeks), this
yields a model unemployment rate of 0.175 × 0.26 = 4.55%, which is the US average for
the 1967-1996 period.20
Borrowing Constraint The ad-hoc borrowing constraint b is calibrated to match
the proportion of agents with negative or zero wealth. In 1983, this number was 15.5%
(Table 1 in Wolﬀ, 2000). The implied borrowing limit is 14 percent of mean after-tax
labor income. In Section 6 we experiment with an alternative in which the only limit on
borrowing is that, conditional on surviving to the maximum possible age, agents must be
able to repay any outstanding debts.
18If there were heterogeneity in taste for leisure, the wage-hours correlation would be biased towards
zero. However, in practice this is not a concern, since the correlation ﬂuctuates around zero in any case.
19Note that this result is robust to the presence of (non-modelled) preference heterogeneity in the
relative taste for consumption versus leisure (deﬁned by ψ).
20The assumption of i.i.d. unemployment shocks is admittedly a simpliﬁcation, but probably not too
unrealistic, since the model’s period is one year, and the average unemployment spell in the US is short
–very few spells exceed one year.
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Individual Productivity Shocks The stochastic part of the individual produc-
tivity process is as follows. During the period 1967-96, the variances of the shocks are
given by the time-varying estimates from Table 2, smoothed with a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter
(with smoothing parameter equal to 100, the standard value for annual data). We ﬁlter
to abstract from high-frequency ﬂuctuations in wage inequality. Before 1967 the wage-
generating process is set equal to the process estimated for 1967, which we later refer
to as the initial steady-state process. Similarly, the post 1996 wage shocks are drawn
from distributions with the estimated variances for 1996. By construction the average
individual endowment of eﬃciency units in the economy is constant over time.
The deterministic life-cycle component of wages, deﬁned by {κa}ara=1 in equation (10),
is a by-product of our ﬁrst-stage estimation of the wage process. For simplicity, we keep
the experience proﬁle constant throughout the simulation, as changes in the returns to
experience documented in Section 2 account for only 11 percent of the overall rise in wage
inequality in our sample.
Production Technology Following a vast literature, the labor share parameter θ
is set to 0.33 and the annual depreciation parameter δ is set to 6 percent. The resulting
after-tax real interest rate is 3.07 percent in the ﬁnal steady-state of the closed economy
version of the model. We set the time-invariant world interest rate in the open economy
version of the model to this value.
Government The US social security system pays old-age pension beneﬁts based on
a concave function of indexed average earnings. This implies that the pension system re-
distributes income, and several authors have documented that the associated risk-sharing
is signiﬁcant (see, for example, Storesletten et al., 2004a, and Deaton et al., 2000). How-
ever, explicitly including such a system in our model would be computationally expensive,
since one new state variable (an index of accumulated earnings) would have to be added.
Here, we adopt a simpler, stylized pension system which can still capture the redistribu-
tion embedded in the US system. In particular, we assume that all workers receive the
same lump-sum pension, the value of which is such that the coeﬃcient of variation of
appropriately-discounted lifetime earnings plus pension income in the ﬁnal steady state
of our economy is the same as in an alternative economy featuring the actual US Old-Age
Insurance system. The implied pension value is 16.4% of average earnings-per-worker.
Finally, we follow Domeij and Heathcote (2004) in setting the tax on labor income, τn,
to 0.27 and the tax on capital income, τ k, to 0.4.
Table 3 summarizes the calibrated parameter values in the benchmark economy.21
21It should be clear from our discussion that the subset of parameters {β, ψ, γ, σ, ν, q, b} is, in practice,
jointly determined in the equilibrium of the model, so the “moment to match” in Table 3 is only an
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5 Benchmark Results
This section presents the results of our numerical simulations for the benchmark economy.
We ask whether the model can account for the evolution through time of cross-sectional
inequality in hours worked, earnings, and consumption, and for the evolution of the
correlation between wages and hours.22
In order to disentangle the sources of changes though time in aggregate variables
and higher moments, we perform a set of counter-factual experiments in which we hold
constant the variance of two of the three components of the shock process. Thus we
are able to assess the extent to which the predicted dynamics for statistics of interest
are primarily attributable to changes in the variance of ﬁxed eﬀects versus persistent or
transitory shocks, one shock at a time.
Averages First, recall that mean wages are constant by construction. Thus aggre-
gates vary over time only because of the eﬀect that changes in the second moments of the
wage process have on individual decision rules. It turns out that such eﬀects on mean
hours, mean consumption and mean income are negligible. The mean wealth to mean
income ratio increases by roughly one percent from the mid 1970s to the early 1990s.
This pattern for the wealth-income ratio is largely accounted for by the rising variance of
persistent shocks over the 1980s, which spurs an increase in precautionary savings. The
rise in the variance of the transitory shocks towards the end of the sample has a simi-
lar eﬀect. The stability of this ratio suggests that the closed-economy equilibrium with
a time-varying interest rate will basically reproduce the results from the open-economy.
This intuition is conﬁrmed in Section 6.
Hours Inequality Figure 3 depicts the dynamics of the variance of log hours in the
model and the data. The model implies a modest increase in this statistic.23 The bottom
panel of Figure 3 indicates that all of the increase is attributable to the rising variance
indication of the moment that gives most information about a particular parameter. The remaining
parameters are set “externally”.
22In Heathcote et al. (2004), we also discuss the quantitative implications of the model along the
life-cycle dimension. Average consumption is strongly hump-shaped, as in the data: the hump peaks
around age 45, consistently with the data reported in Gourinchas and Parker (2002). Consumption
dispersion increases monotonically with age, though the increase is slightly below the estimate of Deaton
and Paxson (1994, Figure 8). Mean hours are stable over the life-cycle, except for a small hump at
the start of the life-cycle and a modest decline after age 50. Both these predictions of the model are
qualitatively consistent with the data. We conclude that taken together the model and the wage process
deliver reasonable predictions in the life-cycle dimension, notwithstanding the fact that the calibration
procedure targets cross-sectional features of the data.
23In terms of “levels”, the model accounts for around two thirds (64%) of the cross-sectional volatility
of hours observed in the data. The residual can plausibly be attributed to heterogeneity across individuals
in the relative taste for leisure.
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of the transitory shock. Note that the size of the increase is well within the range of
short-run ﬂuctuations in the variance of hours observed in our sample.24
Wage-Hours Correlation The model’s predicted time-path for the wage-hours cor-
relation along with measurement-error-corrected estimates from the PSID (see Appendix)
are illustrated in Figure 4. The empirical wage-hours correlation increased through time
until the mid 1980s, and then declined somewhat. The model reproduces this pattern,
and the bottom panel of the ﬁgure oﬀers an explanation for this success. Here we plot the
predicted path for the wage-hours correlation for counter-factual simulations of the model
in which only one component of the wage process exhibits time-varying variance. The
ﬁgure indicates that most of the increase in the correlation is attributable to increasing
variance of transitory shocks. Bigger transitory shocks strengthen the substitution eﬀect
whereby hours worked respond positively to transitory wage increases. Increasing the
variance of persistent shocks has a smaller eﬀect on the wage-hour correlation, since for
persistent shocks a wage increase has a negative wealth eﬀect on hours which partially
oﬀsets the positive substitution eﬀect. Bigger permanent shocks reduce the wage-hours
correlation, since the negative wealth eﬀect dominates the positive substitution eﬀect
when γ is larger than one. We view the empirical evidence of an increasing wage-hours
correlation as independent evidence that the degree of persistence of shocks has in fact
decreased over time, conﬁrming our estimates of the wage process.
Earnings Inequality In the data, the increase in earnings inequality is larger than
the increase in wage inequality. This is due to the rising wage-hours correlation over
time. Figure 5 shows that the model can explain the excess rise in earnings inequality for
precisely the same reason.
An important message is implicit in this ﬁnding: it can be misleading to focus on earn-
ings as the source of idiosyncratic uncertainty, because labor supply acts as an endogenous
propagation mechanism. In our economy, focusing on earnings would overestimate the
true increase in labor market risk (i.e. wage risk) over the past 30 years. By contrast, if
rising wage inequality mainly reﬂected permanent shocks, the rise in earnings inequality
would underestimate the true rise in labor market risk. In other words, without knowl-
edge of the evolution of the underlying shocks to hourly wages, the direction of the bias
is unknown.25
24Moreover, we have abstracted from the extensive labor supply margin: had we included some per-
period cost of participation, the rise in the transitory variance would have induced a growing fraction of
agents with low transitory wage choosing non-participation. Such a pattern would reduce the rise in the
time-proﬁle of hours dispersion conditional on participation, which is what Figure 3 displays. See Juhn,
Murphy and Topel (2002) for evidence on the link between wages and adult male nonparticipation rates.
25Moreover, when earnings are treated as exogenous, one risks overestimating the persistence of the
underlying shocks. The reason is that an agent’s consumption follows a very persistent process, regardless
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Consumption Inequality The relevant unit for studying consumption is the house-
hold. So far this paper has studied implications of changes in inequality for the (male)
head of household. As argued above, the rise in wage inequality accounts for the rise in
male earnings inequality, once labor supply is endogenized. Moreover, as is evident in
Table 1 the rise in household earnings inequality is strikingly similar to the rise in male
earnings inequality, and male earnings are highly correlated with total household earn-
ings (the cross-sectional correlation is roughly 0.9 in all years). One reason for this tight
connection is simply that male earnings account on average for 80 percent of household
earnings in our data. These observations suggest that focusing on male wage risk is a
reasonable starting point for understanding the evolution of household earnings inequality
and, therefore, household consumption inequality. In Section 7 we explicitly extend the
model to incorporate female labor supply, and show that the results are quantitatively
very similar to those for the benchmark male-only model.
Consider now the variance of log consumption (Figure 6, upper panel). Once again,
we focus on the model’s predictions for the dynamics of inequality through time.26 The
model predicts a modest increase in consumption inequality. From 1967 to 1996, the
variance of log earnings increases by 0.20, while the variance of log consumption increases
by less than 0.05. This suggests that a large fraction of the increase in wage inequality is
essentially insurable.27
Partial Insurance The counter-factual experiments in which the variance of only
one component of the stochastic process for wages is time-varying allow us to compute the
elasticity of consumption inequality with respect to the variance of each of the diﬀerent
shocks. These partial insurance coeﬃcients are one way to measure the extent to which
agents can self-insure against shocks. A comparison of the lower panels of Figures 2
and 6 indicates that the elasticity with respect to the pure transitory shock is essentially
zero, since households can self-insure almost perfectly against them. By contrast, the
variance of the persistent component of log wages increases by 0.07 from the late 1970s
to the early 1990s and induces a rise of about 0.02 in the variance of log consumption.
of the properties of the wage shocks. If the leisure choice exhibits non-zero wealth eﬀects, low-frequency
movements in consumption will be inherited by labor supply and thus earnings.
26The model-generated level of consumption inequality is slightly lower than in the data, with a variance
of logs of 0.176 versus 0.196 in the data. As argued above for hours worked, the diﬀerence may be
attributed to cross-sectional heterogeneity in the relative taste for leisure.
27It is also of interest to contrast consumption inequality for the entire population with the correspond-
ing ﬁgures for high and low-ﬁxed-eﬀect types. Conditioning on the ﬁxed eﬀect (which takes two possible
values here) is a convenient way to operationalize a notion of within-group inequality. The model predicts
a decline in within-group inequality through time from 1960-2000, suggesting that the long-run trend in
consumption inequality is attributable to increasing between-group inequality. Interestingly, Krueger
and Perri (2002, Figure 2) document exactly this pattern for within- and between-group consumption
inequality in data from the CEX.
19
Thus, this elasticity is just below 0.3. In a recent paper, Blundell et al. (2003) use PSID
and CEX data to estimate the fraction of random-walk earnings shocks that transmit
to consumption. They ﬁnd a partial insurance coeﬃcient of 40 percent, which is slightly
larger than our estimate. The diﬀerence may reﬂect the fact that our persistent component
is slightly more transient than theirs (we have ρ = 0.94 rather than ρ = 1).
Finally, increasing the variance of the permanent component translates almost one-for-
one into additional variance in consumption. Similarly, Attanasio and Davis (1996) ﬁnd
that low-frequency changes in relative wages between educational groups led to roughly
equally-sized changes in consumption expenditures. Overall, this experiment reinforces
the conclusion that the strong increase in permanent wage inequality over the sample
period accounts for all of the model’s predicted long-run increase in cross-sectional con-
sumption inequality.
One might wonder how an increase in the dispersion of ﬁxed-eﬀects can induce a
change in consumption inequality if it is perfectly-forecasted. One reason is that in our
OLG economy agents cannot purchase insurance against the year of their birth; thus low
skill agents working when the skill premium is relatively large cannot avoid relatively
low permanent income and consumption levels. Moreover, a large fraction of younger
households are borrowing constrained, so their consumption must be driven by current
income rather than by expectations of future income.28
Comparison with Krueger and Perri (2002) The combination of the estimated
wage process and our calibrated incomplete-markets model provides a reasonable account
of the consumption data. This contrasts with the ﬁnding in Krueger and Perri (2002) that
a model with one riskless asset and an exogenous borrowing constraint grossly overstates
the rise in consumption inequality (by a factor of 10). What can explain this discrepancy?
First, they abstract from labor supply and calibrate an income process based on house-
hold earnings data which, as we discussed above, should give rise to a larger increase in
idiosyncratic risk over the sample period than a process estimated on wages. Second, in
their estimation procedure they constrain the variance of the transitory shocks to be con-
stant over time. We re-estimated our shock process using annual earnings data, restricting
the transitory variance to be constant. This implies a substantially larger increase in the
estimated variance of the persistent component. The economic model then predicts a rise
in the variance of log consumption equal to 0.15. This number is three times as large as
in our benchmark model, and close to that of Krueger and Perri.
At the same time, we note that our model does somewhat overstate the rise in con-
28Interestingly, the 1968-96 rise in dispersion of the permanent component induces cross-sectional
consumption inequality to start rising before 1967, as the fraction of living cohorts who are aﬀected by
the change is rising (see the lower panel of Figure 6).
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sumption inequality after the mid 1980s, and the turning point for consumption inequality
occurs some ﬁve years later than in the data. One possible interpretation of this ﬁnding
is that markets for insuring wage risk have improved since the mid 1980s, which is the
central argument of Krueger and Perri (2002).
Wealth Inequality The overall increase in wealth concentration over this period is
similar in model and data. Excluding the wealthiest one percent of households, wealth con-
centration has been relatively stable in recent decades: the Gini coeﬃcient for household-
level net worth in the Survey of Consumer Finances increased by 0.018 between 1983
and 1998 (Table 1 in Wolﬀ, 2000). Our model predicts exactly the same increase over
this period, and the rise is driven by the rise in the variance of the permanent and the
persistent components during the 1980s. However, as in many models of this kind, the
level of wealth inequality in the model is lower than that in the data (Gini coeﬃcient of
0.6 versus 0.73).29
5.1 Welfare Implications
The remarkable performance of the model in explaining cross-sectional dynamics over the
sample period encourages us to consider the welfare implications of the estimated changes
in the wage process. We compare welfare across cohorts as follows. For the cohort entering
the labor market in year t, the ex-ante welfare loss (under the veil of ignorance) associated
with widening wage inequality is deﬁned as the percentage amount by which one would
have to reduce average lifetime earnings in the initial steady state (with low labor-market
risk) in order for an agent to be indiﬀerent between born in the initial steady-state versus
being born in year t. We also compute the expected welfare loss conditional on each of the
two possible values for the ﬁxed eﬀect, which is the welfare loss for a newborn individual
who knows his own ﬁxed eﬀect but who has yet to draw any persistent or transitory wage
shocks.
Ex-ante Welfare The results are portrayed in Figure 7. We ﬁnd that the average
ex-ante welfare cost of widening wage inequality across the 1930-2000 cohorts is 2.3 per-
cent. These costs vary substantially across cohorts, generally increasing through time.
The cohorts which suﬀer most from widening inequality are those joining the labor force
in the mid 1980s. Under the veil of ignorance, agents are indiﬀerent between entering the
labor force in 1986 versus being born in the initial steady-state and suﬀering a 5 percent
reduction in wages and pensions. Thus average welfare losses are large, even though,
the increases in hours inequality and consumption inequality documented in Figures 3
29See Castaneda, Diaz-Jimenez and Rios-Rull (2003) for a discussion on the ability of this class of
models to generate large wealth dispersion.
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and 6 appear relatively modest compared to the size of the surge in wage inequality.
Generalizing to our class of preferences the intuitive approach of Lucas (1987) to welfare
calculation, the overall welfare loss is approximately 4.5 percent, almost identical to the
long-run loss in Figure 7.30
The lower panel of Figure 7 plots the contribution of each shock to the ex-ante welfare
calculation. Transitory shocks have negligible welfare implications, while bigger perma-
nent shocks strongly reduce ex-ante welfare given concave preferences. Time-variation in
the size of persistent shocks is responsible for the non-monotonicity of the welfare losses.
The variance of the persistent component is generally below its initial steady-state value,
so the persistent component yields welfare gains, especially for the cohorts born towards
the end of the sample period.
Conditional Welfare The ex-ante welfare loss calculation conceals large diﬀerences
between the two ﬁxed-eﬀect types. Figure 7 shows that, conditional on having the high
ﬁxed eﬀect, agents enjoy welfare gains from the change in the wage process of up to 12.1
percent, whereas those with low ﬁxed eﬀects bear sizeable losses: 16 percent for the 1986
cohort.
Relation to literature There is a small literature addressing the welfare conse-
quences of rising wage inequality. The preceding exercise showed that the large ex-ante
welfare losses are due to the rising return to permanent skills. In a deterministic life-cycle
framework, Heckman et al. (1998) argue that such between-group diﬀerences might over-
state the true welfare eﬀects of rising educational premia, since one important source of
heterogeneity in permanent skills - investment in education - reﬂects a costly endogenous
choice.
In an exercise similar in spirit to Attanasio and Davis (1996), Krueger and Perri (2003),
estimate a stochastic process for consumption and leisure using data from the CEX, and
evaluate welfare eﬀects with standard preferences. This approach has the advantage that
no restrictive assumptions have to be made on the degree of market completeness. How-
ever, all that can be established through this methodology is the welfare cost of changes
in consumption and leisure inequality, without knowing exactly what fraction of these
changes are attributable to rising wage inequality rather than, for example, tax reforms
30This approximate welfare loss is computed as follows. Assume that the distributions of consump-
tion and leisure are log-normal. The welfare loss can then be decomposed into two parts, φc and
φl, where φc is due to the increase in consumption inequality (holding leisure inequality constant),
and φl is due to the increase in leisure inequality (holding consumption inequality constant). Fol-
lowing Lucas (1987), the former is approximately φc ≈ γ/2 · ∆var (log (ci)) = 1.437/2 · 0.05 = 3.6%.
Moreover, the latter is approximately φl ≈ ψσ/2 · exp
(
(1− γ) γ2 · var (log (ci))
) · ∆var (log (1− hi)) =
1.225 · 2.356/2 · exp ((1− 1.437) · 1.4372 · 0.23) · 0.007 = 0.9%, where the level of consumption inequality,
var (log(ci)) = 0.23, is taken from Krueger and Perri (2002). Details are available upon request.
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or changes in ﬁnancial and insurance markets. Moreover, the presence of measurement
error in the CEX consumption and hours data tends to contaminate such exercises.
Krueger and Perri (2003) report ex-ante welfare costs between one and two percent.
As this ﬁgure is based on inﬁnitely-lived dynasties, it should be compared to a cohort-
by-cohort average of the ex-ante welfare losses of Figure 7, in which case welfare loss
estimates from the two diﬀerent methodologies appear broadly consistent.31
6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of the conclusions we reached with the bench-
mark model. Table 4 summarizes the calibrated parameters in the alternative economies.
6.1 General equilibrium
In all the results reported so far, the interest rate has been constant at the world interest
rate as a consequence of an open-economy assumption (see Section 3.1). Now we compare
the benchmark open-economy model with a closed-economy general equilibrium model
in which the interest rate adjusts to clear the domestic asset market period by period.
Parameter values are identical to those for the benchmark model.
The ﬂuctuations in prices are very small in the closed economy: deviations from open-
economy prices are less than ﬁve basis points (0.05%) for the interest rate and less than
half a percent for the wage rate. These ﬂuctuations are proportional to changes in the
capital-income ratio and are due to movements in aggregate precautionary savings. The
implications of endogenizing prices for inequality in consumption and hours worked are
negligible. Welfare losses are marginally larger than in the benchmark model for those
cohorts whose mean wage is below the wage in the open economy (normalized to 1).
However, all these eﬀects are very small, which means that the degree of international
capital mobility is not quantitatively important in this context, and that we can therefore
safely abstract from general equilibrium considerations.
6.2 Myopic expectations
In our benchmark economy, agents are assumed to have perfect foresight about future
changes in the wage process (see Section 3.1). While this assumption could be questioned,
31By simply plugging the CEX data of Krueger and Perri into the utility function we use here, Storeslet-
ten (2003) computes the welfare loss to be 1.9%, which is, again, in line with our ﬁndings. Yet another
approach is taken by Bowlus and Robin (2002) who focus on the implications of increased dispersion of
lifetime earnings.
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the important issue for our purposes is to assess its impact on the results. To this end we
consider a myopic expectations economy in which agents observe the current year variances
of wage shocks, and assume that future variances will be equal to current variances. All
other aspects of the economy are unchanged.
Our main ﬁnding is that very little changes relative to the perfect foresight economy.
In particular, the evolution of the variance of hours and the welfare losses are virtually
identical across information structures. As one might expect, consumption inequality
increases during transition by slightly more than in the benchmark economy: between
1967 and 1996 the variance of log consumption rises by 0.061 rather than 0.048. As
our wage-process transition features a large increase in the return to skill, agents with
low (high) ﬁxed-eﬀects receive a series of negative (positive) wage changes. When these
changes are unexpected, consumption inequality increases by slightly more than when
they are foreseen.
The wage-hours correlation has the same pattern from the early 1970s onwards in the
two experiments. However, during the 1960s the evolution of the wage-hours correlation
is somewhat diﬀerent. In the myopic case the sharp 1967-1975 rise in the skill premium is
unexpected and induces agents with a high (low) ﬁxed-eﬀect to work less (more), inducing
a fall in the wage-hours correlation after 1967. In contrast, high-skill agents with perfect
foresight about the rise in return to skill after 1967 will substitute intertemporally by
enjoying more leisure before 1967 and decreasing leisure after 1967. This drives the wage-
hour correlation in the perfect foresight case down before 1967 and up thereafter (see
Figure 4). In any case, the wage-hours correlation under either informational structure
oﬀers a good quantitative account of the data.
6.3 Alternative labor supply elasticities
There is some disagreement in the literature regarding the willingness of individuals to
substitute hours inter-temporally. We therefore consider two alternative speciﬁcations for
preferences: preferences that are logarithmic in leisure, and preferences implying inelastic
supply labor. In these economies, we hold γ (the curvature co-eﬃcient on consumption)
at its benchmark level, set σ (the curvature co-eﬃcient on leisure) to the desired value,
and re-calibrate all other parameters following the same calibration strategy outlined in
Section 4.
In the log-leisure case the Frisch elasticity for labor is 1.5 for an individual working
40 percent of his time endowment. This value exceeds the range of estimates in the mi-
cro literature, but is nonetheless of interest since similar elasticities are often assumed in
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calibrated macro-economic models in order to account for the volatility of hours at the
aggregate level. The assumption of inelastic labor supply is extreme in the opposite di-
rection, although micro-estimates for male workers often ﬁnd near-zero elasticities. These
experiments are informative regarding the degree to which hours ﬂexibility constitutes a
useful form of insurance against idiosyncratic wage shocks, thereby mitigating the welfare
costs associated with widening wage inequality.
The simulation results under the alternative preference assumptions are reported in
Figure 8. As one might expect, assuming a much greater inter-temporal elasticity for
labor supply has dramatic implications for inequality in hours. The variance of log hours
in the log-leisure economy rises by 0.04, four times more than in the benchmark economy
and out of line with the data.
A comparison of the dynamics for consumption inequality indicates that, contrary to
the results for hours, the model’s predictions for consumption are not particularly sensitive
to the labor supply elasticity. Compared to the benchmark calibration, the increase
in consumption inequality is slightly larger in the inelastic-labor economy and slightly
smaller in the log-leisure economy. One reason for this result is that γ, the curvature
coeﬃcient on consumption, is greater than one. This implies that rising permanent wage
inequality leads high-ﬁxed-eﬀect agents to consume more leisure, mitigating the increase
in consumption inequality. In addition, labor supply is used as an insurance device for
smoothing consumption inter-temporally. For example, in periods when the borrowing
constraint is binding, a high marginal utility of current consumption induces additional
work eﬀort which in turn raises income and consumption.
The welfare results diﬀer somewhat across the alternative preference speciﬁcations.
The more willing are agents to substitute hours inter-temporally, the smaller are the
welfare costs of widening wage inequality. The reason is that when labor is supplied
elastically, wage volatility induces individuals to concentrate labor eﬀort in periods of
temporarily high productivity, thereby increasing the mean wage per hour worked.
6.4 Natural borrowing constraints
In order to explore the role of the borrowing constraint, we consider an alternative ver-
sion of our benchmark model in which households can borrow freely subject only to the
constraint that if they survive to the highest possible age (99) they must repay all their
debts before they die – the “natural” borrowing constraint (Aiyagari, 1994).
In this economy we keep γ and σ at their benchmark values, and re-calibrate other
parameters. For example, in the natural-borrowing-constraint economy, a slightly higher
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value for β is required in order to replicate the target wealth-income ratio.32
In this economy the fraction of households with less than or equal to zero wealth is
around 31%.33 The increase in consumption inequality is smaller in the natural borrowing
constraint economy: between 1967 and 1996 the variance of log consumption increases by
0.034, compared to 0.048 in the benchmark economy. Through looser borrowing limits,
agents are better able to insure against more volatile wage shocks. Consequently, the
welfare costs associated with rising wage inequality are smaller than under the benchmark
calibration with a much tighter borrowing limit – around half a percentage point smaller
for the worst aﬀected cohorts.
7 Extension: Rising Female Participation
So far, we have abstracted from female labor supply decisions in the household. In this
section we extend the benchmark “bachelor” model by considering a simple model of the
family in which all households comprise a male and a female. This is important for two
reasons. First, the rise in female participation over the past thirty years might be expected
to inﬂuence the dynamics of inequality in household consumption. Second, if male and
female earnings are imperfectly correlated within the household, some insurance within the
family should be possible. This will tend to mitigate the rise in consumption inequality at
the household level associated with widening wage inequality at the individual level. We
explicitly model imperfect correlation of the permanent components of male and female
wages within the household. For simplicity, however, we assume that, in contrast to
the male, the female’s productivity level is not subject to any idiosyncratic shocks after
entering the labor force.34
Model Our family model is simple but nevertheless rich enough to capture the
mechanisms discussed above. Households comprise a male and a female who enter the
labor force together and will die together. Time endowments and productivity shocks
32Note that when we change the labor supply elasticity or the borrowing constraint, we could also have
chosen to recalibrate γ (or both γ and σ in the natural-borrowing-constraint economy). We chose not to
do this, since holding γ ﬁxed makes it easier to compare our welfare results across alternative economies.
33Recall that the borrowing constraint in our benchmark calibration is set so as to match the fraction
of households with zero or negative wealth in the United States. In our model all wealth is liquid and
can facilitate consumption-smoothing. In such a context one might consider net ﬁnancial wealth, which
excludes net equity in owner-occupied housing, a more appropriate empirical measure of wealth for the
comparison, since housing equity is relatively illiquid. The distribution of net ﬁnancial wealth reveals a
much larger fraction of households in the red: between 1983 and 1998 this fraction ranges from 25.7 to
28.7 percent of households in the Survey of Consumer Finances (Wolﬀ 2000, Table 1). These ﬁgures are
close to the fraction for our natural-borrowing-constraint economy.
34This assumption is broadly in line with evidence from Hyslop (2001), who ﬁnds over 90 percent of
the variance of female wages in 1979 to be due to either permanent factors or measurement error.
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for males are exactly as described in Section 3. The female spouse gets no utility from
leisure, and household preferences are, as before, given by (7). Females have a constant
per-period time endowment used for home production or market production. All women
are equally productive (in after-tax terms) at home and in the market. Home production
is assumed to be perfectly substitutable with the market consumption good. Female
labor earnings from market production are pooled with the male’s earnings before the
household’s consumption-savings decision is made.
Clearly, both members of the household are indiﬀerent regarding the female’s time-
allocation between market and home. A household where the female starts to participate
in the market labor force is not better oﬀ in any respect; it simply buys in the market what
the woman used to produce at home.35 Thus, the model is silent on the social welfare
implications of the rise in female participation over the past thirty years, although we
can study the implications of rising participation for measured inequality in household
market consumption, hours and earnings.
Calibration A female’s productivity is determined by her ﬁxed eﬀect. The (time-
varying) variance of this ﬁxed eﬀect and the (constant) correlation between male and
female ﬁxed eﬀects are taken from estimates by Hyslop (2001), who ﬁnds the variance of
the permanent component of log wages for males to be 1.23 times the variance for females,
and the correlation between the two to be 0.57.36
The values for the female time endowment and for average female productivity are set
jointly to reproduce average hours and average earnings for participating women, which
were, respectively, 60 percent and 37 percent of their male counterparts’ in our 1979 PSID
sample (conditional on both household members working in the market).
Given our indiﬀerence result, any sequence of female participation rates is an equi-
librium in our model. This allows us to exogenously impose the time-paths for female
participation rates that replicate the rise observed in the data over the 1967-1996 period.
We consider three alternative economies with diﬀerent assumptions on female participa-
tion. In the ﬁrst, the probability of participation is identical across households and over
35This is true as long as there is not “too much” home-production, i.e. as long as optimally chosen
total consumption always exceeds the amount of consumption produced at home. We verify that this is
always the case in the simulations of the model.
36For simplicity, we assume that both the male ﬁxed eﬀect and the female ﬁxed eﬀect take one of two
values: αm ∈ {αml , αmh } and αf ∈ {αfl , αfh}. At each date 50 percent of newborn men and 50 percent of
newborn women are of the high-ﬁxed-eﬀect type. The conditional probability of a high-ﬁxed-eﬀect male
matching with a high-ﬁxed-eﬀect female is given by (1 + corr(αm, αf ))/2 = 1.57/2 = 0.785. Thus, 78.5
percent of households are matched with similar types while 21.5 percent are matched with the opposite
type. We assume that the relative variance of male and female ﬁxed eﬀects and the correlation between
them are both constant over time. Hence, as permanent male wage inequality rises, so does the gap
between the earnings of high and low productivity women.
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time. This probability is 51.5 percent, the female participation rate in 1970.37 The sec-
ond economy maintains the assumption that participation probabilities are independent
of household characteristics, but imposes a linear increase in the probability from 51.5
percent in 1970 to 70.3 percent in 2000, the average female participation rate in 2000. In
the third economy, participation probabilities are conditioned on the female ﬁxed eﬀect,
to capture the fact that participation rates have risen more at higher levels of education.
We identify high-ﬁxed-eﬀect (low-ﬁxed-eﬀect) women as those with at least some (no)
college education. Given this assumption, the participation rate increased from 47 to 60.5
percent for low-ﬁxed-eﬀect women and from 56 to 80 percent for high-ﬁxed-eﬀect women
between 1970 and 2000.
The preference curvature parameters γ and σ are the same as in the benchmark model,
while the rest are re-calibrated (see Table 4). Introducing a second household member
requires a large reduction in the weight on male leisure; otherwise the wealth eﬀect of the
female’s contribution to consumption would imply unrealistically low male hours.
Results The upper panel of Figure 9 compares the results of the family model un-
der the three diﬀerent assumptions regarding participation trends. Note ﬁrst that the
increase in consumption inequality in the family model with constant participation is
slightly smaller than the increase in the benchmark bachelor model, indicating that the
“insurance eﬀect” of imperfect assortative matching does mitigate the eﬀect of rising dis-
persion in ﬁxed eﬀects as expected. Introducing rising participation reduces the rise in
consumption inequality still further. The intuition is as follows. If no women were to par-
ticipate, the insurance eﬀect would not show up in the household’s market consumption.
As the female participation rate rises towards 100 percent, the share of the households’
consumption of market goods ﬁnanced by female earnings increases, and household con-
sumption inequality comes to mirror household rather than male earnings inequality. In
addition, the dispersion of female productivity is smaller than the dispersion of male
earnings. This is another way in which rising female participation eﬀectively reduces the
impact of rising wage inequality on market-consumption inequality.38
In the third example, the fact that the increase in the participation rate is larger for
high-ﬁxed-eﬀect women than for low-ﬁxed-eﬀect women interacts with positive assortative
matching to generate a larger rise in consumption inequality. High-wage men tend to be
37All participation rates are from the Statistical Abstract for the United States. The 1970 numbers
are from the 1995 edition (Table 629) while the 2000 numbers are from the 2001 edition (Table 571).
38Note that the way we measure inequality here is important. Doubling all households consumption has
no eﬀect on the variance of log consumption. Thus, if males and females within households were perfect
clones of each other, a rise in participation would have no impact on measured household consumption
inequality. In contrast, the variance in levels would increase by a factor of four if the participation rate
went from zero to one.
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paired with high-earning women, and the large increase in the participation rate for these
women increases the weight in the top tail of the household earnings distribution. At the
same time, the average percentage increase in average household earnings for low-wage
men is smaller, since they are more likely to be paired with low-earning and thus still
non-participating women.
Krueger and Perri (2003) document a signiﬁcant decline in the correlation between
household market consumption and household market hours in the CEX over our sam-
ple period. The lower panel of Figure 9 shows the implications of our preferred family
model (with participation rising diﬀerentially) relative to the CEX data. The model gen-
erates the same qualitative fall in the consumption-hours correlation as that observed over
the last 20 years, although the magnitude is smaller (−0.05 versus −0.10 in the data).
This fall is driven mainly by the rise in permanent wage inequality. The rise (fall) in
permanent income for high (low) ability types is associated with a decline (increase) in
hours worked, due to wealth eﬀects. By contrast, in response to a good transitory shock,
hours increase while consumption hardly moves. Thus, bigger transitory shocks lower
the absolute value of the correlation. Since the overall consumption-hours correlation is
negative in the model, more volatile transitory shocks mitigate the size of the decline
in the consumption-hours correlation. The performance along this additional dimension
conﬁrms that, although it is simple, our family model captures key features of the data.
8 Concluding Remarks
Inequality in labor income has increased sharply in the US since the early 1970s, spurring
an intense debate on the implications of a more unequal society. In this paper we use
standard economy theory as a tool to frame the debate and to interpret the data.
We start by documenting that the rise in wage inequality in PSID data was rapid and
persistent from 1975 to 1985, but slower and more transitory thereafter. We then calibate
an overlapping-generations model with endogenous labor supply and incomplete ﬁnancial
markets. When the estimated changes in labor market risk are fed through this model,
the model predicts time-paths for the cross-sectional distributions of consumption, hours
and earnings that closely mirror their empirical counterparts. We show that the changing
relative importance of permanent versus transitory shocks to wages over the past thirty
years has important implications for the extent to which wage inequality translates into
consumption inequality. It also impacts the balance between wealth- and substitution-
eﬀects in labor supply, which is central to understanding the dynamics of co-movement
between hours and wages and thus the dynamics of earnings inequality.
29
We ﬁnd that persistent and transitory wage shocks can be insured away quite eﬀec-
tively by households: for example, equilibrium consumption inequality responds to the
increase in the variance of our persistent component with an elasticity of less than 0.3
and does not respond at all to a two-fold increase in the variance of the transitory shock.
In contrast, changes in the permanent component of wages translate roughly one-for-one
into increased consumption inequality, even when these changes are pre-announced. We
attribute this result to the overlapping-generations structure of the model and to the
presence of borrowing constraints.
Finally, we evaluate the welfare implications of increased labor market risk for US
households. People do not care about income per se but rather about consumption and
leisure. In both US data and in simulations of our model the increases over time in cross-
sectional inequality are much smaller for consumption and hours worked than for wages,
earnings or income. Nonetheless, we ﬁnd that the unconditional expected welfare losses
associated with widening wage inequality can be large. For example, they are equivalent
to a ﬁve percent decline in lifetime income for the cohorts entering the labor market in
the mid 1980s.
There are at least three dimensions in which this project could be extended. First, one
could broaden our study to non-white workers, in which case a more careful consideration
of the participation dimension of male labor supply and of the reasons for their low saving
rates would be needed. Second, one could further extend our simpliﬁed model of the family
by incorporating productivity shocks and valued leisure for the female spouse. Third, we
plan to use the model to measure how the welfare costs of asset market incompleteness
have evolved over time. Note that when markets are complete, a rise in wage (i.e.,
productivity) dispersion can be a good thing, since the Social Planner will raise aggregate
eﬃciency by concentrating labor eﬀort among more productive workers. The fact that
we already ﬁnd large welfare losses from widening wage inequality in our incomplete-
markets model suggests that the potential gains from completing asset markets have risen
dramatically over the past thirty years.
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Appendix
PSID Sample Selection The initial PSID sample for the period 1967-1996 has 146,949
individual/year observations, of which 101,049 belong to the core sample. The race re-
striction (white) reduces the sample to 68,407 observations, and the age selection crite-
rion (20-59) to 53,330. Of these, 50,877 individual/year observations have positive hourly
wages, and 50,826 have earnings which are not top coded. Eliminating the observations
where hourly wages are below half the minimum wage in that year brings the sample
down to 50,166 individual/year observations, and the hours worked requirement (between
520 and 5096 hours per year) shrinks it to 49,135. Keeping only the workers satisfying
the above requirements for at least 2 consecutive years reduces further the sample to its
ﬁnal size of 47,492 individual/year observations. Note that because of this last selection
criterion, some individual records will have a gap of one or more missing years among
years of usable data. In order to maximize the sample size, we treat individuals who have
at least 2 consecutive observations following one or more missing years as new individuals
entering the panel. Counted this way, the ﬁnal sample of our unbalanced panel comprises
3,993 individuals, among which 3,331 individuals have continuous records without any
gaps.
Measurement Error We base our correction for measurement error on the ﬁnd-
ings by French (2002). French uses the PSID Validation Study to assess the size of the
measurement error in log hourly wages and log annual hours for 1982 and 1986. The
PSID sample in his study and the one in our paper have remarkably similar features.
For example, French (Table 2) reports that the average age in his sample in the period
studied (1980-1986) is 38.5, while it is 37.7 in our sample; the variance of log-wages is
.32, just .015 smaller than in our sample; the variance of log-hours reported by French is
.090, while it is .088 in our sample.
He estimates the variance of the measurement error in wages to be .0207 and that in
hours to be .0167 (French 2002, Table 5). Expressed in percentage of the total variance
in our sample, measurement error accounts for 6% of the total variance of wages and
20% of the total variance in hours. Note that this correction for the variance of hourly
wages reduces our estimate of the transitory component by roughly 27%, a number that
seems in line with the literature: Bound and Krueger (1991) validation study on CPS data
concludes that the fraction of the total variance of earnings growth (roughly uncorrelated)
accounted for by measurement error is 28%; Bound et. al (1994) ﬁnd the same number
to be 22% on PSID data. The cross-sectional variability of log-hours remains quite large
even after this correction, with an average percentage standard deviation of around 26%,
of which half is attributable to annual weeks worked and half to average hours worked
per week.
What is the impact of these estimates on the measured wage-hours correlation in
Table 1? In Heathcote et al. (2004) we derive an analytical expression for the true
wage-hours correlation as a function of the measured correlation and measurement error.
The measurement error biases downward this correlation by approximately 9 percentage
points. This is not surprising, given that the size of the error in hours is almost 4 times
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larger than that in earnings.
Identification of the statistical model We use an external estimate of σµ based
on the PSID Validation study to identify uncorrelated wage variability due to measure-
ment error in the data. We make, without loss of generality, the following normalizations:
σα = σv = σω = 1. Note that in the main text we normalized the loading factors at time
t = 1 instead of the variances. Recall that PSID is an unbalanced panel: this property is
crucial for the identiﬁcation.
Assumption 1 (initial steady-state): The data up to 1967 are in steady-state (i.e. no
time variation in the variances).
This Assumption is consistent with the numerical experiment and helps identifying
the statistical model, albeit it can be relaxed without losing identiﬁcation.
Assumption 2 (panel dimensions): T ≥ 3 and A ≥ 3.
We now describe the identiﬁcation procedure for the case T = 3 and A = 3. It will
be immediate that for T < 3 or A < 3 the model will be underidentiﬁed. Consider the
conditional moments sat,t+j = E (yi,a,tyi,a+j,t+j), where the expectation operator is deﬁned
over all individuals i present both at t and at t+ j, conditional on being in the age group
a at time t.
For t = 1, we have:
s111 = φ
2
1 + τ
2
1 + E
(
η2i,1
)
= φ21 + τ
2
1 + π
2
1
s211 = φ
2
1 + τ
2
1 + E
(
η2i,2,1
)
= φ21 + τ
2
1 + π
2
1
(
1 + ρ2
)
s311 = φ
2
1 + τ
2
1 + E
(
η2i,3,1
)
= φ21 + τ
2
1 + π
2
1
(
1 + ρ2 + ρ4
)
The autocorrelation coeﬃcient ρ is identiﬁed by the rate of decline of the autocovari-
ance function in the cross-section, i.e.:
s311 − s211
s211 − s111
= ρ2,
and the initial variance of the innovations to the persistent component π1 is identiﬁed, for
example by s211− s111 = ρ2π21. In fact, it is easy to see that π1 in general is over-identiﬁed.
For t = 3, we have:
s133 = φ
2
3 + τ
2
3 + E
(
η2i,1,3
)
= φ23 + τ
2
3 + π
2
3,
s233 = φ
2
3 + τ
2
3 + E
(
η2i,2,3
)
= φ23 + τ
2
3 + π
2
3 + ρ
2π22.
From the diﬀerence s233 − s133 = ρ2π22 one can identify π2, given knowledge of ρ. And
therefore, from
s123 = φ2φ3 + E
(
ηi,1,2ηi,2,3
)
= φ2φ3 + ρπ
2
2,
the product φ2φ3 is identiﬁed.
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Now, note that putting together
s112 = φ1φ2 + E
(
ηi,1,1ηi,2,2
)
= φ1φ2 + ρπ
2
1,
s113 = φ1φ3 + E
(
ηi,1,1ηi,3,3
)
= φ1φ3 + ρ
2π21,
one can construct the ratio
s112 − ρπ21
s113 − ρ2π21
=
φ2
φ3
.
Thus, we have two equations in the pair (φ2, φ3) which allow us to identify separately the
two parameters.
Then, from s112 we identify φ1 and from s
1
11 we identify the initial variance of the
transitory component τ 1. Using
s122 = φ
2
2 + τ
2
2 + E
(
η2i,1,2
)
= φ22 + τ
2
2 + π
2
2,
we are also able to identify τ 2.
Hence, the only two parameters of the statistical model left to identify are the pair
(π3, τ 3) . Unless we make an additional assumption, the variance of the innovation of
transitory and persistent shocks in the last period cannot be disentangled. The intuition is
that when a shock hits at time t, only by observing data at time t+1 one can learn whether
the shock was persistent or transitory. Obviously, one does not have this possibility in
the last year of the sample t = T , by deﬁnition.
Therefore, we need to make:
Assumption 3 (identiﬁcation at t = T ): πT = πT−1.
This assumption allows us to recover τ 3 from s
1
33, for example.
Finally, note when T = A = 3, we have 9 parameters to identify and a total of 14
moment conditions. In demonstrating identiﬁcation we have used exactly 9 conditional
moments, thus many parameters of the statistical model are already overidentiﬁed when
T = A = 3, and clearly more heavily so as T,A grow.
Estimation Strategy Given the (I ∗ T ) estimated mean-zero residuals
{
{ŷi,t}Ii=1
}T
t=1
from the regression in (1), let si,a,t,(a+n),(t+n) = ŷi,a,tŷi,(a+n),(t+n) with
n = min {A− a + 1, T − t + 1}. Every year, we group individuals in the sample into 10-
year adjacent age cells, the ﬁrst cell being age group “24” containing all workers between
20 and 29 years old, the second cell for age group “25” containing those between 21 and
30 years old, up until the last cell for age group “54” with individuals between 50 and
59. Our sample period and our age grouping imply A = 31 and T = 29. It is useful to
vectorize the autocovariance matrix: for this purpose, construct the appropriate mapping
between the triplet (a, t, n) and the location index m which uniquely determines an entry
of the vectorized autocovariance matrix, with m = 1, ...,M , where
M =
∑
t=1,...,T
∑
a=1,...,A
min {A− a + 1, T − t + 1} .
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Denote by Θ the (1× L) parameter vector and by f (Θ,m) the theoretical covariance
between wages in the two age-group/year cells determining the location index m, as
deﬁned in equation (5) . The moment conditions used in the estimation are of the form
E (χim) [sim − f (Θ,m)] = 0, where χim is an indicator function that equals 1 if individual
i contributes to the moment m (i.e. he has observations in both periods/age groups
determining m) and zero otherwise. The empirical counterpart of these moment conditions
becomes
sm − f (Θ,m) = 0,
where sm =
1
Im
∑Im
i=1 si,m are the entries of the sample covariance matrix, i.e. sm is the
empirical covariance between wages for individuals of age a at time t and wages of the
same individuals n periods later, with the triplet (a, t, n) determining location m. Note
that Im =
∑I
i=1 χim since not all individuals contribute to each moment.
The estimator we use is a Minimum Distance estimator that solves the following
minimization problem
min
Θ
[s− f (Θ)]′ Ω [s− f (Θ)] , (12)
where s, and f (Θ) are the (M × 1) vectors of the stacked empirical and theoretical
covariances, and Ω is a (M ×M) weighting matrix. To implement the estimator, we need
a choice for Ω. The bulk of the literature follows Altonji and Segal (1996) who found
that in common applications there is a substantial small sample bias in the estimates
of Θ, hence using the identity matrix for Ω is a strategy superior to the use of the
optimal weighting matrix characterized by Chamberlain (1984). With this choice, the
solution of (12) reduces to a nonlinear least square problem. Standard asymptotic theory
implies that the estimator Θ̂ is consistent, asymptotically Normal, and has asymptotic
covariance matrix V = (D′D)−1 D′∆D (D′D)−1, where the matrix D ≡ E [∂f (Θ) /∂Θ′]
and the matrix ∆ ≡ E [(s− f (Θ)) (s− f (Θ))′], estimated with their empirical analogs
to compute standard errors.
Computational Details In the partial equilibrium version of the model, the follow-
ing steps characterize equilibrium allocations, given a particular set of parameter values.
1. Discretize the state space For a particular cohort, the individual state variables are
age a, wealth k, ﬁxed eﬀect α, value of the persistent shock η, value of the transitory
shock v, and unemployment status κ. Age is already discrete and ranges from 1 to 80.
We assume that α, v and κ can each take one of two possible values. We assume that
k and η are both truly continuous, but in order to achieve a ﬁnite representation
of decision rules we construct grids with dimensions 50, and 30 respectively over
these variables. The grids on α, η and v are year-varying, to account for changes
over time in the variance of the components of the stochastic process for wages. In
addition, the grid on η is age-varying to account for the fact that inequality in the
persistent component of wages increases with age. The grid on k is exponentially
spaced, so that the grid is relatively ﬁne close to the no-borrowing constraint where
decision rules are likely most non-linear.
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2. Solve for decision rules For each cohort t, we use the fact that in the last period
of life it is optimal to consume all available resources to compute consumption
at a = 80 for each point in our grid on k. We then work backwards age-by-age,
using the agent’s inter-temporal and intra-temporal ﬁrst order conditions along with
the budget constraint and borrowing constraint to solve for the cohort’s optimal
consumption, savings and hours at each point in the grid. We assume that the
decision rule for consumption is piece-wise bi-linear over k and η. We repeat this
exercise for each of 190 cohorts, the ﬁrst cohort being born in 1887 while the last is
born in 2076. Note that by 2076, all living a gents have experienced the same wage-
generating process throughout their entire lifetimes, so the economy has necessarily
converged to a steady state by this date. In total we compute decision rules at
182, 400, 000 (t, a, k, α, η, v, κ) combinations.
3. Simulate the economy We assume that each cohort contains 20, 000 agents. For
each agent in each cohort we draw a permanent wage shocks at birth, and innovations
ω to the persistent shock along with values for v and κ at each pre-retirement age.
In computing cross-sectional moments we are careful to weight cohorts at diﬀerent
ages in proportion to population weights Sa, as deﬁned by survival probabilities.
Recall that in the closed-economy version of the model, the equilibrium after-tax
interest rate and wage are time-varying so that the markets for savings and labor clear
at each date. Characterizing equilibrium allocations in this case is a natural extension
of the approach described above for the open-economy (constant price) case. The only
diﬀerence is that now it is necessary to guess a time-varying sequence for the interest rate
(and, implicitly, a sequence for the capital-output ratio and the real wage). Given an
initial guess for this sequence, {r0t } , we can solve for decisions and simulate the economy
through time, exactly as described above. We then check whether {r0t } is consistent with
household savings and labor supply decisions. In particular, we compute the sequence for
the after-tax marginal product of capital implied by the model time series for aggregate
wealth and aggregate eﬀective hours. Denote this sequence {r̂0t } . If max |r0t − r̂0t | > ε we
update our guess by setting r1t = λr̂
0
t + (1 − λ)r0t ∀t. We then resolve for decision rules,
re-simulate, and compute {r̂1t } . We repeat the entire procedure until max |r0t − r̂0t | ≤ ε.
We ﬁnd that convergence is achieved within seven or eight iterations when λ = 0.5 and
ε = 10−6.
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Table 1: PSID Sample Descriptive Statistics
Head Head Head Head Head Head Head Head Head Head Head Head Household Household Household
Year mean mean mean median variance college/hs mean median variance mean variance corr mean median variance Number
age years edu. wage wage log(wage) premium earnings earnings log(earnings) hours log(hours) (h,w) earn earn log(earn) of obs.
1967 38.50 11.72 14.66 13.46 0.2664 0.3095 33,337 29,905 0.2916 2347.68 0.0822 -0.19 38,125 34,723 0.2803 1502
1968 39.02 11.74 15.19 13.62 0.2689 0.3182 34,254 30,528 0.3135 2320.68 0.0882 -0.14 39,565 35,850 0.2924 1581
1969 38.57 11.88 15.77 14.25 0.2710 0.2910 35,448 31,545 0.3030 2302.29 0.0790 -0.16 40,884 37,112 0.2961 1550
1970 38.58 11.99 15.95 14.15 0.2881 0.3066 35,185 31,277 0.3280 2273.99 0.0893 -0.15 40,937 37,209 0.3204 1547
1971 38.41 12.09 16.27 14.63 0.2825 0.2367 35,578 31,948 0.3155 2253.56 0.0875 -0.18 41,673 38,422 0.3013 1577
1972 38.11 12.17 16.51 14.86 0.2851 0.2601 36,675 32,584 0.3300 2282.80 0.0926 -0.15 42,635 39,100 0.3171 1614
1973 37.90 12.35 16.64 14.94 0.2916 0.2224 37,055 33,743 0.3343 2285.07 0.0844 -0.13 43,062 39,878 0.3384 1637
1974 37.78 12.49 16.37 14.93 0.2800 0.2375 35,501 32,461 0.3461 2213.41 0.0961 -0.10 41,691 38,571 0.3389 1636
1975 37.56 12.57 15.93 14.46 0.2928 0.2831 34,104 30,379 0.3554 2190.71 0.0993 -0.11 40,668 37,327 0.3547 1620
1976 37.48 12.63 16.29 14.55 0.2900 0.2691 35,602 32,793 0.3393 2241.39 0.0880 -0.12 42,198 38,299 0.3435 1626
1977 37.41 12.65 16.50 14.95 0.2779 0.2466 36,177 32,814 0.3271 2234.41 0.0795 -0.10 42,896 39,332 0.3330 1637
1978 37.54 12.68 16.79 15.19 0.2907 0.2508 36,797 33,423 0.3296 2249.96 0.0778 -0.13 44,175 40,735 0.3390 1650
1979 37.57 12.72 16.48 14.93 0.2768 0.2686 35,882 32,952 0.3301 2214.91 0.0765 -0.08 43,541 40,046 0.3351 1661
1980 37.69 12.79 15.97 14.38 0.2921 0.2770 34,288 30,909 0.3437 2192.36 0.0864 -0.10 41,595 38,017 0.3482 1654
1981 37.61 12.84 15.58 14.37 0.3014 0.2759 33,268 29,967 0.3593 2172.00 0.0802 -0.07 40,490 36,883 0.3629 1645
1982 37.69 12.93 15.70 14.04 0.3294 0.3253 33,563 29,639 0.4197 2146.87 0.0952 -0.02 40,683 35,638 0.4297 1627
1983 37.67 12.97 15.76 13.84 0.3286 0.3270 34,215 30,084 0.4300 2168.22 0.0935 0.01 41,925 36,922 0.4326 1617
1984 37.70 12.99 16.31 14.04 0.3474 0.3337 36,187 30,806 0.4294 2209.73 0.0839 -0.03 44,338 38,015 0.4278 1661
1985 37.79 12.99 16.48 14.09 0.3878 0.3698 36,336 30,379 0.4753 2199.65 0.0871 -0.02 44,830 38,037 0.4726 1655
1986 37.73 13.03 16.53 14.15 0.3870 0.4042 36,631 31,067 0.4680 2216.84 0.0878 -0.04 45,589 39,766 0.4755 1645
1987 37.62 13.06 16.04 13.99 0.3713 0.3659 35,821 30,177 0.4601 2228.94 0.0798 0.02 44,903 38,921 0.4735 1646
1988 37.66 13.12 16.31 13.89 0.3879 0.3560 36,548 30,286 0.4688 2241.85 0.0852 -0.02 46,473 40,185 0.4682 1632
1989 37.79 13.15 16.07 13.75 0.3735 0.4105 36,899 30,755 0.4475 2262.93 0.0735 -0.02 46,901 40,119 0.4630 1629
1990 37.90 13.16 15.96 13.68 0.3929 0.4643 36,476 29,960 0.4874 2255.54 0.0844 0.00 46,365 39,820 0.5100 1611
1991 37.98 13.17 16.27 13.50 0.3916 0.4505 36,372 29,500 0.4666 2217.31 0.0858 -0.06 46,521 39,000 0.4817 1612
1992 38.23 13.24 17.30 14.37 0.4014 0.4196 38,118 31,065 0.4746 2219.57 0.0863 -0.04 49,201 41,054 0.4961 1529
1993 38.26 13.24 19.58 15.36 0.4023 0.4796 42,933 33,398 0.4696 2217.80 0.0930 -0.08 55,175 43,834 0.5170 1400
1994 38.30 13.20 18.83 14.84 0.3927 0.4266 42,511 31,850 0.4800 2245.02 0.0771 0.03 53,874 42,152 0.5253 1358
1995 38.57 13.22 17.93 13.93 0.4000 0.4603 40,502 31,060 0.4902 2246.35 0.0754 0.01 51,151 40,471 0.5292 1329
1996 39.43 13.40 18.47 13.97 0.3995 0.4791 41,453 31,164 0.4875 2276.10 0.0827 -0.11 51,715 41,233 0.5111 993
Note: The total number of individual/year observations is 47,492. The total number of individuals in the sample is 3,993. Earnings are
annual earnings and hours are annual hours worked. Wages are hourly wages computed as annual earnings divided by annual hours worked.
Both wages and earnings are expressed in 1992 dollars. The college-high school premium is deﬁned as the log hourly wage diﬀerential between
college graduates and high-school graduates. The correlation is computed between hourly wages and annual hours worked.
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates
Permanent Component Persistent Component Transitory Component
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
σα 0.0578 (0.0069) σω 0.0218 (0.0011) σv 0.0497 (0.0032)
ρ 0.9426 (0.0039)
φ1967 1.0000 – π1967 1.0000 – τ1967 1.0000 –
φ1968 0.9296 (0.0111) π1968 1.1427 (0.0239) τ1968 1.0052 (0.0321)
φ1969 1.0204 (0.0235) π1969 0.8495 (0.0244) τ1969 0.9702 (0.0569)
φ1970 1.0451 (0.0130) π1970 0.9506 (0.0157) τ1970 1.1419 (0.0350)
φ1971 1.0449 (0.0144) π1971 0.7709 (0.0093) τ1971 1.1420 (0.0442)
φ1972 1.1402 (0.0183) π1972 0.9171 (0.0347) τ1972 1.1558 (0.0558)
φ1973 1.1119 (0.0171) π1973 0.6075 (0.0158) τ1973 1.2297 (0.0576)
φ1974 1.2227 (0.0184) π1974 0.3789 (0.0121) τ1974 1.2423 (0.0646)
φ1975 1.3634 (0.0132) π1975 0.5108 (0.0552) τ1975 1.2636 (0.0576)
φ1976 1.3689 (0.0154) π1976 0.8531 (0.0131) τ1976 1.2342 (0.0561)
φ1977 1.3448 (0.0151) π1977 0.7904 (0.0381) τ1977 1.2209 (0.0676)
φ1978 1.3581 (0.0166) π1978 0.7943 (0.0095) τ1978 1.2965 (0.0315)
φ1979 1.3121 (0.0117) π1979 0.9982 (0.0280) τ1979 1.1620 (0.0636)
φ1980 1.3103 (0.0118) π1980 0.8497 (0.0532) τ1980 1.2260 (0.0709)
φ1981 1.3070 (0.0105) π1981 1.3114 (0.0669) τ1981 1.1526 (0.0655)
φ1982 1.3472 (0.0104) π1982 1.2448 (0.0745) τ1982 1.1619 (0.1343)
φ1983 1.3776 (0.0144) π1983 1.0251 (0.0192) τ1983 1.1980 (0.0346)
φ1984 1.4716 (0.0126) π1984 0.8345 (0.0148) τ1984 1.2817 (0.0409)
φ1985 1.5484 (0.0106) π1985 1.0750 (0.0098) τ1985 1.3437 (0.0197)
φ1986 1.6645 (0.0235) π1986 0.8713 (0.0624) τ1986 1.2385 (0.0177)
φ1987 1.5294 (0.0107) π1987 1.2001 (0.0526) τ1987 1.1940 (0.0458)
φ1988 1.6303 (0.0207) π1988 0.9786 (0.0664) τ1988 1.2048 (0.0112)
φ1989 1.5806 (0.0091) π1989 1.1023 (0.0113) τ1989 1.1012 (0.0193)
φ1990 1.5671 (0.0177) π1990 1.0960 (0.0527) τ1990 1.1805 (0.0255)
φ1991 1.5513 (0.0313) π1991 1.1647 (0.0423) τ1991 1.1809 (0.0477)
φ1992 1.4310 (0.0327) π1992 0.6777 (0.0414) τ1992 1.4890 (0.0127)
φ1993 1.4819 (0.0365) π1993 1.0599 (0.0536) τ1993 1.3905 (0.0236)
φ1994 1.4538 (0.0329) π1994 1.1213 (0.0281) τ1994 1.3629 (0.0226)
φ1995 1.6240 (0.0453) π1995 0.8472 (0.0873) τ1995 1.2190 (0.0517)
φ1996 1.5806 (0.0227) π1996 0.8472 – τ1996 1.3655 (0.0884)
Note: The number of observations is 47,492 and the number of autocovariances is 9,920.
The values of the loading factors in 1967 are normalized to 1. The loading factor for the
innovations to the persistent and transitory components in the last year of the sample
(π1996, τ 1996) are not separately identiﬁed, hence we have used the identiﬁcation assump-
tion π1996 = π1995 (see Appendix).
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Table 3: Calibrated Parameter Values for the Benchmark Economy
Parameter Value Moment to Match
A 79 Maximum lifespan after labor market entry
ar 40 Maximum years of working life
{sa} − Survival rates (NCHS, 1992)
β 0.962 Wealth-Income ratio, excluding top 1% (SCF)
γ 1.437 Wage-Hours correlation (PSID)
σ 2.356 Variance of changes in hours (PSID)
ϕ 1.225 Fraction of time devoted to work (PSID)
ν 0.867 Average duration of unemployment (PSID)
q 0.175 Incidence of unemployment (PSID)
b 0.057 Fraction of households with net worth ≤ 0 (SCF)
{κa} − Wage-Experience proﬁle (PSID)
θ 0.330 Capital share (NIPA)
δ 0.060 Depreciation rate (NIPA)
p 0.066 CV of lifetime after-tax earnings and pensions (SSA)
τn 0.270 Labor income tax (Domeij and Heathcote, 2004)
τ k 0.400 Capital income tax (Domeij and Heathcote, 2004)
Table 4: Calibrated Parameter Values for Alternative Economies
γ σ β ϕ b ν
Benchmark 1.437 2.356 0.962 1.225 0.057 0.867
General-Equilibrium 1.437 2.356 0.962 1.225 0.057 0.867
Log-Leisure 1.437 1.000 0.955 2.148 0.092 0.876
Inelastic Labor Supply 1.437 ∞ 0.963 − 0.048 −
Natural B.C. 1.437 2.356 0.972 1.244 − 0.888
Family Model 1.437 2.356 0.970 0.690 0.075 0.882
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Figure 1
The Facts: Dynamics of Inequality in the U.S. (1967-2000)
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The upper left panel plots the cross-sectional variance of log hourly wage and log
annual earnings; the upper right panel plots the cross-sectional variance of log annual
hours; the lower right panel plots the cross-sectional variance of log consumption. All
these variables are expressed in terms of deviations from mean cross-sectional inequality.
The lower left panel plots the correlation between log hourly wages and log annual hours,
expressed as the deviations from the mean sample correlation. Sample means (corrected
for measurement error, thus diﬀerent from the means of the raw data in Table 1) are
reported in each panel (see the Appendix for details). Note that the scale of all four
panels is the same.
43
Figure 2
Statistical Model of Wage Dynamics: Variance Decomposition
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The upper panel plots, for every year in the sample, the cross-sectional variance of
the idiosyncratic component of wages in the data, and the ﬁt of the statistical model.
The lower panel decomposes, year by year, the variance of the model into the variances of
ﬁxed-eﬀects, persistent shocks, and transitory shocks. The estimate of the autocorrelation
coeﬃcient ρ is .94.
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Figure 3
Hours Inequality: Theory versus Data
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The upper panel represents the variance of log hours worked, 1960-96, in the bench-
mark model versus PSID data, expressed in deviations from the mean. The lower panel
decomposes these eﬀects: each line shows the path for inequality in hours when only one
type of shock exhibits time-varying conditional variance.
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Figure 4
Correlation Between Wages and Hours: Theory vs. Data
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The upper panel plots the cross-sectional correlation between wages and hours worked,
1960-96, in the benchmark model versus PSID data. The PSID estimates are corrected
for measurement error (see Section 8). Both model and data are expressed as deviations
from the mean. Mean data and model coincide, since the average value of this correlation
is a target of the calibration. The lower panel decomposes these eﬀects: each line shows
the path for corr(hi, wi) when only one type of shock exhibits time-varying conditional
variance.
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Figure 5
From Wages to Earnings Inequality: Theory versus Data
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The graph represents cross-sectional inequality in hourly wages and annual earnings
from PSID data and from the benchmark model economy. Inequality is measured as
variances of logs, relative to the mean.
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Figure 6
Consumption Inequality: Theory versus Data
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The upper panel represents cross-sectional inequality in consumption from CEX data
(Krueger and Perri, 2002) and from the benchmark model economy. Inequality is mea-
sured as variances of logs, relative to the mean. The lower panel decomposes these eﬀects:
each line shows the path for consumption inequality when only one type of shock exhibits
time-varying conditional variance.
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Figure 7
Welfare Gains of Change in Wage Process
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The upper panel represents welfare gains of being born in year t, relative to being
born in the initial steady-state (negative numbers are losses). The middle graph is ex-
ante welfare gains, and the upper and lower graphs are gains conditional on high or low
permanent skills (ﬁxed eﬀect in wages), respectively. The lower panel decomposes the
ex-ante welfare eﬀects: each line shows the average gain if only one type of shocks were
to exhibit time-varying conditional variance.
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Figure 8
Implications of Varying the Labor Supply Elasticity
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The panels display key statistics for economies with alternative intertemporal elastic-
ities of substitution for leisure (1/σ), relative to the benchmark economy. The “Inelastic
Labor”-economy rules out variation in hours worked, while the “σ = 1”-economy has
a utility function u(c, h, ν) = c
1−γ
1−γ + ψ log(1 − ν − h). These economies are otherwise
calibrated as described in Section 4.
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Figure 9
Implications of Rising Female Participation
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The upper panel displays consumption inequality in the data, for the three versions
of the family model described in Section 7. The lower panel represents the consumption-
hours correlation from CEX data (Krueger and Perri, 2002) and from the family model
with diﬀerential increases in participation between groups.
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